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Introduction
Over the past few decades, China has sustained economic
growth averaging 9.8 percent between 1978 and 1997,((1)
putting it in the fourth place globally in GDP terms. In 2006
and 2007, growth has increased at a rate (11.1 percent and
11.5 percent)((2) that should make China overtake Germany
for the third spot in 2008. The same projections show the
Chinese economy overtaking Japan’s around 2015 (Figure
1). China, which had been dubbed the “workshop of the
world,” is also the top producer of consumer goods such as
textiles, televisions sets, mobile phones, and toys. Since the
early 1980s, the economy has grown five-fold, and per capita
income has quadrupled.((3) Internally, this fast-paced growth
has led to a sharp fall in the number of people living below
the poverty line, as well as the emergence of a middle class.
Behind these gratifying data, however, many problems lurk.
Firstly, studies show that growth has been accompanied by
spectacular inequalities between urban and rural residents((4)
(Figure 2). Moreover, the education and social protection
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China has paid little attention to environmental issues over the decades, preferring to give priority to economic
development. In this article, we start off with an examination of the acute and catastrophic problems in the
environmental domain. We then consider environmental social conflicts these problems have generated, and which
have grown exponentially in recent years. We conclude by assessing the Chinese authorities’ approach to these
problems.
reforms carried out in the late 1990s have left many people
with average and modest incomes in a precarious situation.
These multiple problems have fuelled many social move-
ments, which have spread at a disquieting rate in recent
years. In July 2005, Zhou Yongkang, then public security
minister, revealed figures confirming a steep rise in the num-
ber of protest movements, officially labelled “mass inci-
dents” (quntixing shijian), a catch-all term for sit-ins, strikes,
demonstrations, roadblocks, traffic disruptions, picketing of
leaders, confrontations with police, collective protests, and
riots. Figures for 2004 showed 74,000 protest movements
involving a total of 3.76 million people.((5) In 2005, (accord-
ing to published Chinese government figures) the number of
protest movements rose by 6.6 percent to 87,000.((6) Accord-
ing to the Public Security Bureau, its branches recorded
200,000 petitions and visits by protesters in 2005 and dealt
with them with a view to forestalling further social move-
ments. The sharp rise in the number of movements, linked
to rising inequalities, is disturbing.((7) Social movements
recorded in recent years were mainly sparked by ill-treatment
and exploitation of internal migrant workers, factory clo-
sures, illegal expropriation of land (34 million farmers lost all
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or part of their land between 1987 and 2001),((8) disputes
over urban accommodation, local corruption, and especially
the environment.
China’s environmental problems stem from its decades-long
strong growth for the profit of humans at the expense of na-
ture. Overall, China has lagged behind in environmental
matters, in terms of international indicators: An official
study published recently by Xinhua puts China in the
100th place among 118 developed or developing countries
in terms of ecological modernisation.((9) The worst situation
is with regard to water – lakes, rivers, and coastal areas. For
instance, China’s third biggest lake, Taihu, is polluted by a
blue-green phytoplankton algae that recently proliferated
thanks to abundant nutrients contained in industrial dis-
charge – a eutrophication phenomenon.
Wuxi City has found the drinking water that it draws from
this lake turning greenish and nauseous, disrupting supplies
to its two million residents.((10) More than 70 percent of
China’s lakes and rivers are said to be polluted, and “at
least 320 million rural residents have no access to drinking
water, 400 cities are inadequately supplied, with 110 of
these seriously lacking supplies,” according to Wang
Shucheng, who was water resources minister until last
year.((11)
Atmospheric pollution is equally serious. According to the
State Environmental Protection Administration
(SEPA),((12) air quality in nearly half of China’s cities is
medium or bad due to suspended particles stemming from
urban pollution.((13) In cities with more than a million resi-
dents, sulphur dioxide (SO2) is among the most serious pol-
lutants. China is the world’s largest emitter of sulphur diox-
ide, with 25.5 million tonnes produced in 2005. This leads
to recurring acid rain. For instance, in Guangzhou, during
the first three months of 2007, acid rain reached 100 per-
cent, with pH dropping to 3.8,((14) a high acidity level that
could give rise to infectious diseases.
In this article, we discuss social movements associated with
environmental issues, and the authorities’ response. Some-
times the damage is so great that it affects people’s vital
needs, leaving them no choice but to join collective action
and collective movements or violent collective protest. In
the first section below, we consider conflicts sparked by en-
vironmental problems. Then we examine the authorities’ at-
titude to these conflicts. We seek to assess in particular the
role of an authoritarian leadership under a sole ruling party
in this catastrophic environmental situation, and the need
for structural reforms that are indispensable for China’s sta-
bility.
Confli cts  stemming f rom po llut ion problems
Pol lution inc idents
According to the China Statistical Yearbook, between 1995
and 2004 there was an average of 1,800 pollution incidents
annually, ranging from 1,400 to 2,400 accidents. (One of
the most widely reported was the benzene poisoning in the
Amur River in November 2005, which provoked a diplo-
matic crisis with Russia.)((15) At the local level, these inci-
dents of pollution, or more recurring problems, could endan-
ger the health, and even the life, of people in the most seri-
ously polluted cities. According to a report by the World
Bank and SEPA, pollution lies behind 750,000 premature
deaths annually.((16) For instance, the incidence of cancer is
high in Beijing, and in parts of the countryside such as
Huangnijiao, a village in Zhejiang Province, 50 percent of
inhabitants in the 35-45 age group have liver cancer due to
industrial pollution. The incidence of cancer is also high in
the nearby cities of Xinchang and Shengzhou, sparking
major popular unrest in July 2005.((17) It is worth noting the
remarks of Pan Yue, deputy director of SEPA, in an inter-
view with Der Spiegel. A former journalist, Pan eschews of-
ficial jargon, as these robust words show:((18)
Acid rain is falling on one third of the Chinese terri-
tory, half of the water in our seven largest rivers is
completely useless, while one fourth of our citizens
does not have access to clean drinking water. One
third of the urban population is breathing polluted air,
and less than 20% of the trash in cities is treated and
processed in an environmentally sustainable manner.
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Development and environmental conflicts in China
Asked what effect it has on the economy, Pan said:
It’s massive. Because air and water are polluted, we
are losing between eight and 15% of our gross domes-
tic product. And that doesn’t include the costs for
health. Then there’s the human suffering: In Beijing
alone, 70% to 80% of all deadly cancer cases are re-
lated to the environment. Lung cancer has emerged
as the No. 1 cause of death.
Factories (or other establishments) responsible are targeted
by nearby residents, who mount protest movements. An ear-
lier study on the subject of environmental conflicts is that of
sociologist Jun Jing in 2000, detailing 278 conflicts from the
mid 1970s to the early 1990s.((19) This number seems quite
modest compared to recent figures; since the start of the 21st
century, the number has grown dramatically.
Recent  increase  in  environmenta l  confl i cts
In terms of overall figures (including different issues and
protests), available data indicates a steep increase in protest
movements in recent years. Chinese authorities label them
“mass incidents,” but we will also use the term “collective in-
cidents” in this article. According to the Blue Book of Chinese
Society 2005, published by the Chinese government, in the 10
years between 1993 and 2003, mass incidents confronting the
Chinese authorities rose from 10,000 to 60,000, and the num-
ber of participants from 730,000 to 3,070,000.((20) There were
74,000 protest movements in 2004, with a total of  3.76 mil-
lion people taking part; the number of protests rose to 87,000
in 2005,((21) an average of 240 incidents each day.((22) These fig-
ures, drawn from Chinese official sources, are alarming. They
show a steep increase since 1993 (Figure 3). It should be
noted that these protests also include social movements linked
to the situation of retired workers, labour conditions, dismissals,
and expropriation of property, and don’t relate to environmen-
tal problems alone. 
As for purely environment-related conflicts, figures are un-
available for the period as a whole, but SEPA director
Zhou Shengxian admitted in an interview that the number
of collective incidents linked to the environment had risen
29 percent yearly in recent years. Zhou did not give the fig-
ures for the most recent years, but said that in 2005 there
were 51,000 incidents linked to environmental pollution.((23)
Such statements coming from multiple sources are not easy
to combine, because they give no indication of the method
of data collection or the criteria used in categorising an
event. It is not specified, for instance, whether the 51,000
incidents linked to pollution are accounted for in the overall
figure of 87,000 collective incidents. If this is the case, it
means that 60 percent of collective incidents in 2005 were
due to pollution problems, which is already a high percent-
age. Using Zhou’s second figure of 29 percent growth, we
arrive at a total of 40,000 collective incidents linked to pol-
lution in 2004, which, taken with the total of 74,000 collec-
tive events mentioned in Figure 3 would correspond to 53
percent. If this is extrapolated to the previous year, the fig-
ure of 29 percent growth gives us 31,000 collective incidents
linked to pollution in 2003, which, read with the total of
58,000 collective incidents in Figure 3, also yields 53 per-
cent. In the absence of other figures, we can regard as a re-
alistic hypothesis that the figures mentioned come from a
common accounting, and advance the figure of 53 to 60 per-
cent as the total of collective incidents linked to environmen-
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S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
tal pollution problems between 2003 and 2005. In an inter-
view with Radio Free Asia, Zhou indicated that “mass in-
cidents” provoked by pollution are increasing,((24) and he
elsewhere stressed that pollution had become a major cause
of social instability.((25) This trend is further confirmed in a
report published in March 2008.((26)
In Table 1, we cite examples reported in the Chinese and in-
ternational press, some of which are among the most dra-
matic events. The thousands of cases included in the statis-
tics above are certainly not all as dramatic. These examples
concern eight of the biggest instances of revolt or protest
movements on environmental issues in recent years. The
Dongyang riots of April 2005 were clearly a major event,
and showed that radicalisation can pay, because this move-
ment was able to gain the attention of the central authorities.
These cases also show the contagious effect of the
Dongyang riots: In the following months, four similar revolts
took place in the same province, namely Zhejiang. The
demonstrators noted in many cases that the Dongyang riots
had served as their model, pointing to a real risk of conta-
gion for this type of movement. This contagion benefits from
modern communication methods such as mobile phones
with digital cameras, the Internet, and access to foreign
media. It makes for a new form of “resource mobilisation”
for social movements,((27) which may be called the “multime-
dia method.” Such communication could unleash chain re-
actions of protest movements, especially when the grievance
sparking the protest is shared by a wider population and if
the movement is organised. We analyse this later, while dis-
cussing institutional response to protest movements linked to
the environment.Ins titutional  ac tion and i tsl imits
Envi ronmental  revol t  and dynast ic success ion
We will now examine the attitude of Chinese authorities
towards this situation. The authorities need to react, if
only for economic reasons, given that according to SEPA,
environmental problems cost the government about 10
percent of GDP in 2005.((28) In fact, violent collective
protests linked to environmental problems have left
China’s leaders increasingly worried, as they recognise
that it is a major factor in social instability. More gener-
ally, a close look at Chinese imperial history would clearly
show that popular revolt has often been linked to climatic
and meteorological problems.((29) Among the Chinese dy-
nasties, the Tang,((30) Song, Yuan, and Ming were over-
thrown following popular revolt that developed alongside
environmental problems: poor harvest, locust attacks,
drought, and major floods leading to famine. These histor-
ical traditions of legitimisation of environmental revolts
persist strongly in post-imperial Chinese culture and lend
a strong underlying legitimacy to environment-related so-
cial movements in China today. This historical aspect ex-
plains why on the one hand populations affected by pollu-
tion problems do not hesitate to join together to put up pe-
titions and demonstrate, and on the other why the govern-
ment remains wary of these movements, and often en-
dorses the protests by shutting factories and establish-
ments at the centre of troubles.
Administration of  environmental  protect ion:  SEPA and EPBs
On the institutional front, the authorities’ response to envi-
ronmental problems and the movements they generate is still
far from perfect. While Chinese laws on environmental pro-
tection have addressed a number of pollution issues (Table
2), they are still too vague when it comes to modalities for
application.((31) The implementation of various laws and di-
rectives is left to SEPA. Created to replace NEPA (Na-
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24. Via http://epochtimes.com/b5/7/7/6/n1765439.htm, April 2008.
25. Fazhi ribao op cit.
26. Huanjing lüpishu, Zhongguo huanjing de weiji yu zhuanji (2008) (Green book on the cri-
sis and environmental transition in China (2008)), Yang Dongping et al. (eds.), Shehui
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Cambridge University Press, 1998; Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly,
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28. Shanghai Daily, 6 June 2006.
29. This seems to hold true for other civilisations as well: See for instance, Emmanuel Le
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1860, Paris, Fayard, 2006.
30. For the Tang, one recent study sets out the correlations between years of poor monsoon
(derived from an examination of sedimentary core) and the years of revolts; see Gergana
Yancheva et al., “Influence of the intertropical convergence zone on the East Asian mon-
soon,” Nature, vol. 445, 2007, pp. 74-77; see also David Zhang, Jane Zhang, Harry Lee,
Yuan-qing He, “Climate change and war frequency in Eastern China over the last millen-
nium,” Human Ecology, vol. 35, 2007, pp. 403-414.
31. Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, London, 2004 ;
Alex Wang, “The Downside of Growth: Law, Policy and China’s Environmental Crisis,”
Perspectives, vol. 2, 2000 ; Benjamin van Rooij, “Implementation of Chinese
Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and Political Campaigns,” Development and
Change, vol. 37, 2006, pp. 57-74.
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Development and environmental conflicts in China
tional Environmental Protection Agency) in 1998, SEPA
was at the same time elevated to ministerial rank. In March
2008, it was announced that the agency would soon attain
full ministerial status, with a corresponding boost to its re-
sources. In the current situation, its role is central to envi-
ronmental protection, and it is the locus for international
contact in the environmental domain. Its role, among oth-
ers, is to ensure monitoring, organise measuring networks,
fund research, formulate laws, and promulgate control pro-
cedures. SEPA also conducts Environmental Impact As-
sessments for major industrial projects. To accomplish all
this, the State Council decreed that SEPA could have a
mere 200 officials,((32) grossly insufficient to carry out in-
spections, which have been growing in number as cam-
paigns and crackdowns have mounted over the past few
years. 
At the local, that is provincial and municipal levels, laws and
national directives on environmental protection are imple-
mented by the Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs).
The EPBs depend on both SEPA and local governments.
The 2,000-odd bureaus, spread around the country and to-
talling some 60,000 employees,((33) are vested with the task
of carrying out monitoring, watching out for emissions from
new projects, enforcing fines on polluting enterprises, and
launching legal actions against those continuing to cause pol-
lution problems.
Supervis ion  by  SEPA and the  EPBs  andl imits  to their  act ions
Since 2001, spot checks formed part of several campaigns of
inspections and punitive actions: The number of inspections
rose from around 140,000 in 2001 to 500,000 in 2003,((34)
leading to the closure of the most highly polluting factories.
These inspection campaigns were carried out by SEPA of-
ficials in collaboration with six other ministries, including
those of justice and supervision.((35) In 2006, inspections tar-
geted 720,000 enterprises, 28,000 problem cases were de-
tected, and 3,176 enterprises that illegally discharged pollu-
tants were temporarily or permanently shut.
In 2007, punitive action was taken against four of the five
top electricity producers, a list of four industrial cities that
had exceeded their pollution quotas was published, and 82
industrial projects were halted because of environmental
problems.((36) But these campaigns are not always effective,
because SEPA officials function at a distance from the
problem areas. Often, by the time officials arrive at inspec-
tion spots, the enterprises have ceased producing  pollu-
tants, only to resume as soon as the officials turn their
backs.
These limits to SEPA’s effectiveness show that local mon-
itoring can only be carried out by actors on the ground
such as the EPBs. But at the local level political and social
obstacles keep the EPBs from going about their business,
and render them largely toothless institutions. For instance,
although they are formally linked to SEPA, EPB officials
effectively depend on local governments for their salaries,
their office premises, and other needs.((37) This often com-
promises their independence and leads to situations de-
scribed as “local protectionism,”((38) with local governments
seeking to defend their economic interests rather than car-
ing about the state of the environment. Most of the time,
enterprises are allowed to continue polluting the air and
water after paying a tax to the EPBs. These fines become
just another source of funding for local governments and
have nothing to do with reducing pollution.((39) In 2007,
SEPA deputy director Pan Yue severely criticised the dys-
function induced by the attitude of local officials, and de-
nounced the protection of local authorities enjoyed by
many polluting enterprises.((40)
Benjamin van Rooij narrates a case in which he met the
local actors: A phosphorus mine in an area east of Kunming
was so central to the local economy that the taxes it paid
were a considerable source of funds for the local govern-
ment. As all the actors were directly or indirectly depend-
ent on the mine, none among them had any interest in seek-
ing a strict observance of environment laws. Van Rooij’s en-
quiries showed that it would be easier to apply environment
protection laws where local economic alternatives exist,
such as industries other than those that pose environmental
problems.((41)
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32. Voir Richard J. Ferris Jr. and Hongjun Zhang, “Environmental Law in the People’s
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Sustainable Development, London, M.E. Sharpe, 2005, pp. 66-101.
33. Abigail Jahiel, “The Organization of Environmental Protection in China,” China Quarterly,
1998, p. 772.
34. Benjamin van Rooij, op cit.
35. See the SEPA site mentioned earlier.
36. Le Monde, 16 January 2007.
37. Xiaoying Ma and Leonard Ortolano, Environmental Regulations in China, Lanham,
Rowman & Littlefield , 2000. Elizabeth Economy, “Environmental Enforcement in China,”
in Kristen A. Day (ed.), op cit., pp. 102-120.
38. Benjamin van Rooij, op cit.
39. Jean-François Tremblay, op cit.
40. Xianggang dajiyuan shibao, 6 July 2007.
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• 10 April 2005: Dongyang City, (Zhejiang Province), water pollution from a factory. In an attempt to resist plans
to build a new factory in the Huashui zone, already filled with 13 factories, 20,000 farmers fought the police, and
60 official vehicles were left overturned or destroyed. This “mass incident” also left 30 people injured. Some 3,000
police officers were reported to have been brought in to quell this action. (1) The riots were sparked by concern over
the health of children, local crops having been rendered unfit for consumption because of massive pollution of soil
and water. In the aftermath of the events, which received nationwide attention, the rioters had their way as the fac-
tories were ordered to clean up. (2) In the following months, the city’s 13 polluting firms were shut. But the price
paid was high, as some farmers were beaten and others arrested. A dozen protesters were given prison terms of up
to five years. These events had a contagious effect, serving as a model for many similar movements.
• June 2005: Cangan County (Zhejiang Province), court action against a power plant project using waste as fuel. A
court action was launched by 300 farmers who retained a lawyer to try and block plans for a power plant using toxic
waste. The plant would have used 400 tonnes of waste daily, producing dioxin. (3)
• June 2005, Jianxia Village (Zhejiang Province), battery factory. Hundreds of villagers who rioted and took 1,000
workers hostage in a protest against pollution by Tianneng Battery Company were attacked by police. The villagers
said the factory had been causing air pollution for 15 years, making children sick. (4)
• July 2005: Xinchang Village (Zhejiang Province), explosion and water pollution. Thousands of people demon-
strated against a pharmaceuticals factory following heavy water pollution when the river flooded. (5) The protesters
then confronted the security forces. In mid-July, the farmers surrounded the factory, overturned police vehicles, and
threw rocks at the police. Many people were injured in the ensuing repressive action by the police. (6) Protesters said
they had been inspired by recent events elsewhere.
20 August 2005: Changxing City (Zhejiang Province), farmers in Meishan Village and other neighbouring 
villages surround a power plant to protest against serious pollution. Several thousand protesters confronted the po-
lice. Many farmers were injured and several arrested. Two police vehicles were destroyed. (7)
• April 2006: Quanzhou City (Fujian Province), factories attacked over water and air pollution. On 9 April 2006,
hundreds of villagers attacked factories in a tannery complex, causing much material damage. (8)
• December 2006: Fuwen Village, Shunchang County (Fujian Province), protest by villagers against a chemical fac-
tory. Demonstrators blocked a highway while demanding an end to the discharge of polluted water and gas from a
recently developed industrial zone consisting of 35 factories. (9)
• January 2007: Botang City (Guangxi Province), arrest of ten farmers who planned to attack a paper factory. The
Zhongtaifu paper factory was held responsible for heavy pollution that made it impossible to grow rice and fruit.
The government had ordered the factory to shut down, but that had not been followed through, and the farmers
lost patience. (10) •
1. Zhang Yulin, Tansuo yu zhengming, N°5, May 2006. Also Los Angeles Times, 3 September 2006; Washington Post, 13 June 2005.
2. Jean-François Tremblay, “Tempers flare in China,” Chemical and Engineering News, vol. 83, 2005, pp. 21-28.
3. China Daily, 14 June 2005.
4. AFP, 30 June 2005.
5. Jean-François Tremblay, op cit., p. 21-28; AP, 24 July 2005.
6. Zhang Yulin, tansuo yu zhengming, op. cit.
7. Ibid.
8. Zhaohua Li, “Villagers attack factories over pollution in Eastern China,” China Digital Times, 13 April 2006.
9. “Fujian villagers block road to protest pollution,” Radio Free Asia, 3 January 2007.
10. AP, 26 January 2007.
Table 1. “Mass  incidents” sparked by pollution
Development and environmental conflicts in China
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At present nine laws specifically cover environmental protection:
• Law on marine environment protection. Promulgated 23 August 1982, amended 25 December 1999.
• Law on prevention and control of water pollution. Promulgated 11 May 1984, amended 15 May 1996 and 2 Feb-
ruary 2008.
• Law on prevention and control of atmospheric pollution. Promulgated 5 September 1987, amended 1 September
2000.
• Law on protection of the environment. Promulgated 26 December 1989.
• Law on prevention and control of environmental pollution by solid wastes. Promulgated 1995, amended April
2005.
• Law on prevention and control of pollution from environmental noise. Promulgated 29 October 1996, amended 1
March 1997.
• Law on prevention and control of desertification. Promulgated 1 January 2002.
• Law on appraising environment impacts. Promulgated 1 September 2003.
• Law on prevention and control of radioactive pollution. Promulgated 1 October 2003.
These are complemented by 10 laws on the environmental protection aspects of resources, energy, agriculture,
forests, or fishing.
• Law on forests. Promulgated 20 September 1984, amended 29 April 1998.
• Law on cultivable land. Promulgated 18 June 1985, amended 28 December 2002.
• Law on fishery. Promulgated 1 January 1986, amended 31 October 2000 and 28 August 2004.
• Law on mineral resources. Promulgated 19 March 1986, amended 29 August 1996.
• Law on water. Promulgated 21 January 1988, amended 1 October 2002.
• Law on protection of wild life. Promulgated 1 March 1989, amended 28 August 2004.
• Law on conservation of water and soil. Promulgated 29 June 1991.
• Law on conservation of energy. Promulgated 1 January 1998, amended in 2007.
• Law promoting clean production. Promulgated 1 January 2003.
• Law on renewable energy. Promulgated 1 January 2006.
These 19 laws directly or indirectly address environmental protection. They are complemented by dozens of meas-
ures and guiding rules issued by the State Council.
The laws and rules provide a general guideline, which are then applied locally by the adoption of specific local laws
and rules at the provincial or municipal levels. An estimated 1,000 local laws and rules cover environmental protec-
tion.
There is thus a legal framework for environmental protection, but these texts are often deemed too vague and im-
precise. They state their aims but without explicitly listing banned activities or clear threshold values. (2) •
1. Source: www.lawinfochina.com (April 2008). It gives access to English versions of a number of legal documents of the PRC.
2. Alex Wang, “The Downside of Growth: Law, Policy and China’s Environmental Crisis,” Perspectives, vol. 2, 2000; Benjamin van Rooij, 
“The Enforceability of Chinese Water Pollution Regulations: What Room for Improvement?” 
Table 2. Chinese laws relating to the environment (1)
S p e c i a l  f e a t u r e
Non governmental  organisations
The above discussion shows that local action for environ-
mental protection via the EPBs hardly makes for optimal ef-
ficacy. In practice, the central government also needs the
participation of environmental civil society in environmental
issues. Environmental civil society may be defined as the set
of intermediate organisations between the state and the fam-
ily, independent of the state, their members entering volun-
tarily into association with the aim of defending a well-iden-
tified cause. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) be-
long in this category. Environmental NGOs have existed in
China since 1994, with the founding of “Friends of Nature”
as the first Chinese organisation. The number of such
NGOs rose to 2,000 by 2000.((42) These NGOs have to reg-
ister with the Civil Affairs Ministry in order to enjoy legal
status and have it renewed annually. This allows the state to
control or shut down groups that fail to follow all the rules.
Given this stranglehold, Chinese NGOs do not play the role
of opposition or seek to supervise the government the way
their Western counterparts do. They avoid conflict and con-
troversy and do not confront the authorities.((43) They are not
structured as a counter-balance to power, because if they
were, they would be banned. In fact, the authorities see
them as non-state organisations cooperating with governmen-
tal institutions in sensitising and informing the public, help-
ing organise clean-up campaigns, and obtaining aid through
their contacts with foreign entities.((44) They are not going to
be emancipated from this straitjacket anytime soon but, ac-
cording to Ma Jun, a Chinese water specialist, “the NGOs
are something new in China. We have just made a begin-
ning.”((45)Conclusion:  Pol lution and thenature  o f the  Chinese regime
China is a non-democratic country. Its development prob-
lems are therefore quite often analysed in a way that high-
lights deep structural causes, and environmental problems
are no exception. Indeed, the following points may be noted:
- On the one hand, the problems of chemical pollution of
the environment are stark and demand, above all, sweeping
political action.
- On the other hand, the central government seems to have
attached priority to this problem over the past several years
because of three compulsions: (i) avoiding social conflicts,
(ii) improving the population’s health, and (iii) reducing
economic loss and achieving more efficient growth.
It is clear, therefore, that there is political will, but it does
not meet with the intended results on the ground. In fact, ob-
servers often stress that government orders concerning, for
instance, inspection demands or closure of polluting firms
are ignored by local officials, as the latter often have inter-
ests in local industrial activities. Use of force or non-legal
means by victims to make their grievances heard is a last re-
sort; affected populations in general prefer legal means such
as petitions or court actions. Picketing of corrupt or un-
scrupulous local officials often figures in the lists of collective
incidents recorded by the authorities. Lack of supervision
over local officials is basically a structural problem inherent
in the authoritarian nature of power in China.
Faced with mounting anger of an “environmental mass” that
threatens to degenerate into violent collective protests in all
corners of the country, China’s central authorities seem to
be engaged in a furious internal debate over deeper reforms
in the Communist Party’s structure. Pan Yue stressed in an
interview published in July 2007 in the daily Xinjingbao
that the notion of environment in China is no longer linked
to technical problems, budgets, or functioning, but rather
structural problems that can or cannot be reformed. He
thinks that at the structural level, the most basic reform re-
quired is in the system for recruiting officials, which needs
to take environmental norms into account.((46) No doubt,
these reforms will not come about in the near future, but the
mere fact that they have been talked about is a sign of
awareness within the Chinese leadership of the structural
nature of environmental problems. •
• Translated by N. Jayaram
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42. Jonathan Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits,” Pacific Affairs,
vol. 77, 2004, pp. 28-49.
43. Peter Ho, “Greening Without Conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs and Civil Society in
China,” Development and Change, 2001, vol. 32, pp. 893-921. Phillip Stalley and
Dongning Yang, “An Emerging Environmental Movement in China?” The China Quarterly,
vol. 186, 2006, pp. 333-356.
44. Jonathan Schwartz, op. cit. Guobin Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional
Dynamics in China,” The China Quarterly, 2005, vol. 181, pp. 46-66.
45. Le Monde, 16 January 2007.
46. Xianggang dajiyuan shibao, 6 July 2007.
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